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Abstract
This paper provides formal accounts of dishonest attitudes of agents. We in-
troduce a propositional multi-modal logic that can represent an agent’s belief and
intention as well as communication between agents. Using the language, we for-
mulate different categories of dishonesty. We first provide two different definitions
of lies and provide their logical properties. We then consider an incentive behind
the act of lying and introduce lying with objectives. We subsequently define bull-
shit, withholding information and half-truths, and analyze their formal properties.
We compare different categories of dishonesty in a systematic manner, and exam-
ine their connection to deception. We also propose maxims for dishonest commu-
nication that agents should ideally try to satisfy.
Keywords: dishonesty, multi-modal logic, belief and intention, communication
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1 Introduction
Men are able to trust one another, knowing the exact degree of dishonesty
they are entitled to expect.
—Stephen Leacock (1869–1944, Canadian Humorist)
Dishonesty is a fact of daily life. A behavioral economist Dan Ariely experimen-
tally shows that there are various forces which urge people to behave dishonestly [3].
He argues that an average person has “the delicate balance between the contradictory
desires to maintain a positive self-image and to benefit from cheating”, and a person
rationalizes his/her dishonest behavior using this balancing act. There are a number of
words representing dishonest attitudes of humans—bluff, bullshit, cheat, concealing,
deceit, dodge, fake, fraud, fudge, and lie, to name a few. These different categories
of dishonesty frequently appear in human communication to benefit the self or avoid
conflict. According to a study in social psychology [26], 20%–30% of conversation are
in fact lies.
In classical speech act theory, on the other hand, a speaker who makes an asser-
tion is assumed to obey the sincerity rule that “the speaker commits himself to a belief
in the truth of the expressed proposition” [63, p.62]. This basic principle is not ap-
plied to human agents who may behave dishonestly in communication. The issue is
also pointed out for the FIPA agent communication language: “In Arcol, an agent
must make only sincere contributions (assertives that are believed true, requests that
it intends should succeed) and may assume that other agents also make only sincere
contributions. Consequently, you cannot use Arcol in settings where sincerity cannot
be taken for granted—for example, in electronic commerce or, broadly, in negotiation
of any kind” [65]. The need for relaxing the sincerity condition in agent communica-
tion is also argued for in [51]. As such, formulating dishonesty in agent communica-
tion and constructing behavioral rules for dishonest agents are necessary and challeng-
ing. Many philosophers have discussed dishonest behaviors of humans in the literature
[7, 15, 33, 39, 64, 67, 71], while relatively little study exists for formulating and com-
paring different categories of dishonesty. A reason for this is the fact that defining the
notion of dishonesty has been the topic of extensive discussion. For instance, Mahon
[42] examines twelve different definitions of lying in the literature and argues which
one is empirically acceptable. Moreover, when we reason about dishonesty we cannot
simply take a subjective view and represent an agent’s beliefs by means of formulas of
classical propositional logic. We need modal operators of belief and intention in order
to be able to represent at the same time what an agent believes and what the agent in-
tends to communicate (which might contradict the agent’s beliefs). Thus, providing a
formal account of dishonesty requires one to overcome various difficulties.
The issue of formulating dishonesty is relevant as a research topic not only in phi-
losophy, but also in artificial intelligence (AI). In AI the question “Can computers
deceive humans?” has been of interest since Turing’s imitation game [72]. The pur-
pose of the game is to devise an intelligent computer which behaves like humans in
conversation. A computer attempts to convince a judge that it is human through appro-
priate, and often deceptive, responses. A recent study shows that lying by computers
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affects judges’ misclassification in that computers are considered human [80].1 There
are several reasons why the study of dishonesty is important in AI. (i) First, dishonest
behaviors are inherent to human beings, that require intelligence and thinking.2 Some
researchers remark this fact: “Lying is related to intelligence . . . lying demands both
advanced cognitive development and social skills that honesty simply doesn’t require”
[10] and “lying is challenging in terms of cognitive control because an individual must
hold two mental states (i.e., their own and that of another) in mind” [13]. Studies
on dishonesty can therefore contribute to better understanding human intelligence and
take us one step closer to realizing “human-like” AI. (ii) Second, understanding the
mechanism of dishonesty opens possibilities to develop computers which select dis-
honest behaviors as moral or secretive decisions. Such “artificial liars” are considered
effective in a number of situations [16]. For instance, we can imagine a robot for med-
ical care which does not inform a patient of the true state of affairs. An intelligent
personal assistant might deceive us to influence us to make a right decision. Appli-
cations of lying in AI and knowledge engineering are also reported in the literature
[8, 17, 27, 66, 78]. (iii) Third, studying dishonest acts in the context of multiagent sys-
tems is necessary for designing social agents who behave economically to minimize
costs and/or maximize benefits. Lying or deception is in fact one of the strategic in-
teractions between self-interested agents, and its effects have been analyzed from the
game-theoretic viewpoints [24, 28, 75]. Some studies show potential utilities of dis-
honest acts as a strategy in multiagent negotiation [28, 69, 81], formal argumentation
[11, 53, 59], and in social interactions [12, 70]. (iv) Fourth, the new field of compu-
tational morality or machine ethics has emerged in AI for computationally modelling
moral decision making [2, 79]. Formal theories for encoding ethical rules and compu-
tational logics for realizing computational morality have also been studied by several
researchers [34, 50]. Clearly, morality and dishonesty are closely related—they are
two different sides of the same coin. Studying dishonesty will thus contribute to better
understanding morality and designing ethical agents.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a logical account of dishonesty. To represent
dishonest attitudes of agents, we need a logic that can distinguish belief of truth and
an act of falsehood. Moreover, it is necessary to represent intention of a speaker and
to reason about the belief state of a hearer. To this end, we first introduce a proposi-
tional multi-modal logic BIC that can represent three modalities: belief, intention and
communication. Using the logic, we first formulate sincere communication between
agents, which is later contrasted with dishonest communication. We then proceed
to formal accounts of dishonesty where four different categories are considered: lie,
bullshit, withholding information and half-truth. We represent them using the logical
language of BIC and prove their semantic properties using its axiomatic system. We
compare those categories in a systematic manner and argue their connection to decep-
tion. We also address qualitative and quantitative dishonesty maxims that agents should
try to satisfy both for moral and self-interested reasons.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the logic that is
1Interestingly, an experiment shows that truth-telling by a machine is often taken as a double bluff by a
human judge resulting in misclassification it as human.
2It is well known that non-human animals often deceive other individuals, which is a result of natural
selection for the struggle for existence [45].
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used in this paper and formulates sincere communication. Section 3 provides a logical
framework of lies and investigates formal properties. Section 4 formulates bullshit,
withholding information, and half-truth. Section 5 proposes postulates and maxims for
dishonest agents. Section 6 compares different categories of dishonesties and addresses
related works. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 A Logic for Belief, Intention and Communication
In this section, we first introduce a propositional multi-modal logic BIC which is used
in this paper. We then formulate in BIC conditions for sincere communication.
2.1 BIC logic
The propositional multi-modal language L of the logic BIC is built from a finite set
of propositional constants P = {p, q, r, . . .} on the logical connectives ¬ and ∧, and
on three different types of modal operators, (Ba)a∈A, (Ia)a∈A, and (Cab)a,b∈A, where
A = {a, b, c, . . .} is a finite set of agents.3 Well-formed formulas (or sentences) in
L are defined as follows: (i) If p ∈ P , then p is a sentence. (ii) If ϕ and ψ are
sentences, then ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ are sentences. (iii) If ϕ is a sentence and a, b ∈ A,
then Baϕ, Iaϕ, and Cabϕ are all sentences. The logical connectives , ⊥, ∨, ⊃ and
≡ are introduced as abbreviations as usual. The set of all sentences in L is denoted
by Φ. Throughout the paper, lower case letters a and b represent agents in A and
Greek letters δ, λ, σ, ϕ, ψ represent sentences in Φ unless otherwise stated. A sentence
Baϕ represents an agent’s internal belief and is read as “an agent a believes ϕ”. A
sentence Iaϕ represents an agent’s intention in action and is read as “a intends ϕ”. A
sentence Cabϕ represents an agent’s intentional communication to another agent and
is read as “a communicates ϕ to b”. By communication, we understand any method
by which an agent a informs an agent b of a sentence σ, be it linguistically or not.
Nevertheless, we often call “a” a speaker and “b” a hearer in Cabσ, although we do
not restrict communication to speech acts. As a special case, we sometimes consider a
situation where a = b. When a communicates a sentence σ to b, we assume that any
information that is logically implied by the sentence is implicitly communicated. For
instance, if one communicates the sentence p∧q, then one also implicitly communicates
p and implicitly communicates q. We also assume that communication is instantaneous
such that a hearer recognizes information at the moment when it is dispatched from a
speaker. For instance, if a speaker a tells a sentence σ to a hearer b in a conversation,
information in σ is conveyed to the hearer at the moment when the speaker utters the
sentence.
The semantics of BIC is given by the Kripke semantics for normal modal operators.
Formally, a BIC model is a tuple (W, ν, (Ba)a∈A, (Ia)a∈A, (Cab)a,b∈A) where
• W is a set of possible worlds.
• ν : P → 2W is a truth assignment mapping each propositional constant to the
set of worlds in which it is true.
3By an agent we mean a human agent or an artificial agent like a robot or a computer program.
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• Ba ⊆ W ×W is a serial, transitive and Euclidean binary relation on W . That
is, ∀u ∈ W ∃v ∈ W , uBav; ∀u, v, w ∈ W , uBav and vBaw imply uBaw; and
∀u, v, w ∈ W , uBav and uBaw imply vBaw.
• Ia ⊆ W ×W is a serial relation onW , namely, ∀u ∈ W ∃v ∈ W , uIav.
• Cab ⊆ W ×W is a serial relation onW , namely, ∀u ∈ W ∃v ∈ W , uCabv.
• Ia is transitive and Euclidean over Ba. That is, ∀u, v, w ∈ W , uBav and vIaw
imply uIaw; and ∀u, v, w ∈ W , uBav and uIaw imply vIaw.
• Cab is transitive and Euclidean over Ba. That is, ∀u, v, w ∈ W , uBav and vCabw
imply uCabw; and ∀u, v, w ∈ W , uBav and uCabw imply vCabw.
• Cab is transitive and Euclidean over Ia. That is, ∀u, v, w ∈ W , uIav and vCabw
imply uCabw; and ∀u, v, w ∈ W , uIav and uCabw imply vCabw.
Intuitively, uBav (resp. uIav) means that v is compatible with a’s belief (resp. inten-
tion) at u. Likewise, uCabvmeans that v is compatible with uwhere a’s communication
to b has taken place. The satisfaction of a sentence in a possible world w ∈ W of a
BIC modelM is defined as follows.
• (M,w) |= p iff w ∈ ν(p) for p ∈ P .
• (M,w) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,w) |= ϕ.
• (M,w) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M,w) |= ϕ and (M,w) |= ψ.
• (M,w) |= Baϕ iff (M,u) |= ϕ for every u ∈ W s.t. wBau.
• (M,w) |= Iaϕ iff (M,u) |= ϕ for every u ∈ W s.t. wIau.
• (M,w) |= Cabϕ iff (M,u) |= ϕ for every u ∈ W s.t. wCabu.
A sentence ϕ is true in a model M at a world w iff (M,w) |= ϕ. ϕ is true in a model
M (written M |= ϕ) iff (M,w) |= ϕ for any w ∈ W . ϕ is valid iff M |= ϕ for any
BIC modelM .
The logic BIC has the following axioms and inference rules:
1. (P) All propositional tautologies.
2. The axioms for B (the system KD45):
(KB) Baϕ ∧Ba(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ Baψ
(DB) ¬Ba⊥
(4B) Baϕ ⊃ BaBaϕ
(5B) ¬Baϕ ⊃ Ba¬Baϕ
3. The axioms for I and C (the system KD):
(KI) Iaϕ ∧ Ia(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ Iaψ
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(DI) ¬Ia⊥
(KC) Cabϕ ∧ Cab(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ Cabψ
(DC) ¬Cab⊥
4. The bridge axioms among B, I and C:
(4IB) Iaϕ ⊃ BaIaϕ
(5IB) ¬Iaϕ ⊃ Ba¬Iaϕ
(4CB) Cabϕ ⊃ BaCabϕ
(5CB) ¬Cabϕ ⊃ Ba¬Cabϕ
(4CI) Cabϕ ⊃ IaCabϕ
(5CI) ¬Cabϕ ⊃ Ia¬Cabϕ
5. Rules of inference:
(MP) From ϕ and ϕ ⊃ ψ infer ψ.
(NB) From ϕ infer Baϕ.
(NI) From ϕ infer Iaϕ.
(NC) From ϕ infer Cabϕ.
The following inference rules are derived in BIC.
(EB) From ϕ ≡ ψ infer Baϕ ≡ Baψ.
(EI) From ϕ ≡ ψ infer Iaϕ ≡ Iaψ.
(EC) From ϕ ≡ ψ infer Cabϕ ≡ Cabψ.
The definition of BIC theorems is standard: a BIC theorem is a formula that is
obtained from axiom instances via the inference rules. We write  ϕ iff a sentence ϕ
is a theorem of BIC. Some useful theorems are listed below [18]:
(D)  ϕ ⊃ ¬¬ϕ
(R)  ϕ ∧ψ ≡ (ϕ ∧ ψ)
(C)  ϕ ∨ψ ⊃ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
where  is either Ba, Ia or Cab. It is well-known that:  (ϕ ⊃ ¬¬ϕ) ≡ ¬⊥.
When  is Ba (resp. Ia or Cab), the theorem D is referred to as DB (resp. DI or
DC). Similar reference will be done forR and C.
Proposition 2.1 Let i (i = 1, 2) be either Ba, Ia or Cab.
 (12ϕ ∧12ψ ) ≡ 12(ϕ ∧ ψ).
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Proof: By (EB) and (R), it holds that  Ba(ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ Ba(ϕ ∧ ψ). By (RB),
it holds that  Ba(ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ Baϕ ∧ Baψ. Hence,  Baϕ ∧ Baψ ≡
Ba(ϕ ∧ ψ). Similarly, we can show that:  Iaϕ ∧ Iaψ ≡ Ia(ϕ ∧ ψ) and
 Cabϕ ∧ Cabψ ≡ Cab(ϕ ∧ ψ). Hence, the result holds. 
The result of Proposition 2.1 is easily extended to:
 (12 · · ·kϕ ∧ 12 · · ·kψ ) ≡ 12 · · ·k(ϕ ∧ ψ)
by repeatedly applying (E) and (R).
One may argue that the axiom (KC) is too strong because if a communicates ϕ to
b, all that ϕ deductively entails is communicated as well. A similar problem happens
with (KB), however, one believes every theorem—a well-known logical omniscience
[29]. This is a fundamental difficulty that lies in the nature of Kripke-style modal
semantics for modelling knowledge and belief, but we do not address the issue further
in this paper. By (NB) and (KB), each agent believes that other agents follow the same
logic as itself. Thus, “BaBbϕ ⊃ Ba¬Bb¬ϕ” and “Ba(Ibϕ ∧ Ib(ϕ ⊃ ψ)) ⊃ BaIbψ”
are BIC theorems, for instance. The necessitation rule (NI) says that every theorem
holds at all states of affairs that an agent a might intend to bring about. (NC) says
that every theorem is unconditionally communicated from a to b. This is the case since
every agent shares theorems under the same logic. Technically, both (NI) and (NC)
are needed for the completeness with respect to Kripke models.4
Each axiom has its semantic correspondence as follows [74]. The axioms (DB),
(DI), and (DC) respectively correspond to seriality of the relations Ba, Ia, and Cab.
The axioms (4B) and (5B) respectively correspond to transitivity and Euclidianity of
the relation Ba. The axiom (4IB) corresponds to transitivity of Ia over Ba, and (5IB)
corresponds to Euclidianity of Ia over Ba. The axioms (4CB), (5CB), (4CI), and
(5CI) respectively correspond to their counterparts in similar ways. With this corre-
spondence, it is easy to see that the axiomatic system of BIC is sound. Moreover,
these axioms characterize canonical models [74], so that the axiomatic system is also
complete.
2.2 Sincere communication
In this paper we consider communication which satisfies the following two conditions:
• A statement is made by a speaker (statement condition).
• A statement is received by a hearer (addressee condition).
The statement condition says that communication accompanies a statement of a sen-
tence. The addressee condition says that communication requires the existence of a
hearer. Communication is sincere if it satisfies the condition:
• A speaker believes the statement to be true (truthfulness condition).
The truthfulness condition represents the sincerity rule of the speech-act theory. More-
over, sincere communication is intentional if it satisfies the condition:
4Similar usages are observed in [23, 40, 48, 73].
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• A speaker intends that a hearer believes the statement to be true (intention con-
dition).
The condition says that intentional sincere communication is not simply saying some-
thing that one believes to be true, but involves an intention to make a hearer believe
it. Note that as remarked in Section 2.1 we assume communication such that a hearer
recognizes a statement at the same moment when the speaker makes the statement.
Thus, intentional sincere communication is such that a speaker believes a sentence and
communicates it to a hearer, while intending the hearer’s believing the sentence at the
moment when the communication is taken place.5
Under the logic BIC, (intentional) sincere communication is formulated as follows.
Definition 2.1 (sincere communication) Let a and b be two agents and σ ∈ Φ. Then
a sincere communication is defined as follows.
SINCab(σ)
def
= Cabσ ∧Baσ. (1)
In this case, we say that an agent a sincerely communicates a sentence σ to another
agent b. By contrast, an intentional sincere communication is defined as follows.
I-SINCab(σ)
def
= SINCab(σ) ∧ IaBbσ. (2)
By definition, communication from an agent a to another agent b is sincere if a
communicates a believed-true sentence σ to b. In (1), both the statement condition
and the addressee condition are represented by Cabσ, and the truthfulness condition is
represented byBaσ. In (2), the additional condition IaBbσ is imposed on SINCab(σ),
which represents that a has the intention that σ is believed by b. In what follows,
(I-)SINCab(σ) means either SINCab(σ) or I-SINCab(σ). (Intentional) sincere
communication has the following properties.
Proposition 2.2 (sincere communication on valid or contradictory sentences)
1.  (I-)SINCab().
2.  (I-)SINCab(⊥) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: 1. The result follows by the fact that Cab, Ba, and IaBb are all theorems
of BIC. 2. (I-)SINCab(⊥) implies Cab⊥ that contradicts (DC). 
Proposition 2.3 (sincere communication on combined sentences)
1.  (SINCab(λ) ∧ SINCab(σ) ) ≡ SINCab(λ ∧ σ).
2.  ( I-SINCab(λ) ∧ I-SINCab(σ) ) ≡ I-SINCab(λ ∧ σ).
5To characterize belief change of a hearer, temporal or dynamic logic would be more appropriate. How-
ever, we do not formulate the effect of communication nor belief change of a hearer. Whether or not a speaker
makes sincere communication depends only on the belief and intention of a speaker, and is independent of
the effect of the action. This is in contrast to deception discussed in Section 6.2.
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Proof: 1. SINCab(λ)∧SINCab(σ) ≡ (Cabλ∧Cabσ)∧ (Baλ∧Baσ). By two theo-
rems (RC) and (RB), it holds that  Cabλ∧Cabσ ≡ Cab(λ∧σ) and  Baλ∧Baσ ≡
Ba(λ ∧ σ). Hence, the result holds.
2. I-SINCab(λ) ∧ I-SINCab(σ) ≡ SINCab(λ ∧ σ) ∧ IaBbλ ∧ IaBbσ. By Propo-
sition 2.1,  IaBbλ ∧ IaBbσ ≡ IaBb(λ ∧ σ) holds. Hence, the result holds. 
Proposition 2.4 (sincere communication on contrary sentences)
1.  (SINCab(σ) ∧ SINCab(¬σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
2.  ( I-SINCab(σ) ∧ I-SINCab(¬σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: The results hold by Propositions 2.2 and 2.3. 
A sentence of the form σ ∧ ¬Baσ is known as Moore’s paradoxical sentence [47].
The Moore sentence is not communicable in sincere communication.
Proposition 2.5 (sincere communication on Moore sentence)
 (I-)SINCab(σ ∧ ¬Baσ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: (I-)SINCab(σ∧¬Baσ) ≡ (I-)SINCab(σ)∧(I-)SINCab(¬Baσ) by Propo-
sition 2.3. (I-)SINCab(σ) ∧ (I-)SINCab(¬Baσ) implies Baσ ∧ Ba¬Baσ. Baσ
implies BaBaσ (4B), while Ba¬Baσ implies ¬BaBaσ (DB). Contradiction. 
In speech act theory it is often assumed that communicating a sentence σ counts as
an expression of the speaker’s belief that σ.6 This assumption is formally represented
as follows.
Definition 2.2 (communicating belief) Let a and b be two agents and σ ∈ Φ.
Com Belab(σ)
def
= Cabσ ⊃ CabBaσ. (3)
With this assumption, the following result holds.
Proposition 2.6 (sincere communication on belief)
 (SINCab(σ) ∧ Com Belab(σ)) ⊃ SINCab(Baσ) .
Proof: SINCab(σ) implies Cabσ ∧ Baσ. Cabσ ∧ Com Belab(σ) implies CabBaσ.
Baσ implies BaBaσ by (4B). Hence, the result holds. 
An agent has a belief of his/her communication.
Proposition 2.7 (introspection)
 (I-)SINCab(σ) ⊃ Ba (I-)SINCab(σ) .
Proof: The result holds by Definition 2.1 and the axioms (4CB), (4B), and (4IB). 
6“Thus to assert, affirm, state (that p) counts as an expression of belief (that p)” [62, p. 65].
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Communication involves a speaker and a hearer. On the other hand, we can con-
sider the special case of communicating to oneself, for instance, taking a note for re-
membering or keeping a diary. Normally, if one believes a fact, then he/she does not
intend to make oneself disbelieve the fact. We call it a rational balance between be-
lief and intention.7 Such a rational balance between belief and intention is formally
represented as follows.
Definition 2.3 (rational balance) Let a be an agent and σ ∈ Φ.
RBa(σ)
def
= Baσ ⊃ ¬Ia¬Baσ . (4)
In this case, we say that a is rationally balanced on the sentence σ.
Proposition 2.8 (intentional sincere communication is rationally balanced)
 I-SINCaa(σ) ⊃ RBa(σ) .
Proof: I-SINCaa(σ) implies IaBaσ, which implies ¬Ia¬Baσ by (DI). 
3 Lies
In this section, we first provide two different definitions of lies based on Mahon [42]
and investigate their formal properties. We then consider incentives behind the act of
lying8 and introduce the notion of lies with objectives.
3.1 Two definitions of lies
A lie is a representative of dishonest acts by people. According to Wikipedia, there
are 30 different types of lies.9 In spite of its familiarity to most of us, the question of
“What is lying?” has been subject to extensive studies by a number of philosophers
[5, 7, 14, 30, 42, 64]. Mahon [43] argues that the most common definition of lies
requires the statement condition, the addressee condition and the intention condition of
Section 2.2. On the other hand, instead of truthfulness of sincere communication, lies
require the condition:
• A speaker believes the statement to be false (untruthfulness condition).
Note that the untruthfulness condition says that a speaker believes the falsity of the
statement but the actual falsity of the statement is not requested. So if a speaker makes
a believed-false statement which is in fact true, then the speaker’s act is considered a
7The term is borrowed from [21]. Note that the intention here is the present-directed intention which is
an intention to do some action now, and is different from the future-directed one which is an intention to do
some action later [9].
8Some researcher distinguishes “lying” and “telling a lie” in the literature [64], while we do not distin-
guish lying and lies and use those terms interchangeably in this paper.
9Lie. In Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved November 2014, from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lie
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lie.10 Note also that the untruthfulness condition focuses on the content of the state-
ment, so if a statement is made not by a speaker but in fact by some impostor, the state-
ment is not considered untruthful as far as it contains no information of the speaker.
Moreover, lies involve an intention to deceive on the statement made by a speaker.
Thus, if one says something manifestly false as a joke or a metaphor, it is not a lie.11
Among a number of different definitions of lies, Mahon [42] states that the four
necessary conditions are actually sufficient.
To lie (to another person) is: to make a believed-false statement (to an-
other person) with the intention that that statement be believed to be true
(by the other person)—[38] and [42, (L6)].
The definition is formulated in BIC as follows.
Definition 3.1 (lie) Let a and b be two agents and σ ∈ Φ.
LIEab(σ)
def
= Cabσ ∧Ba¬σ ∧ IaBbσ. (5)
In this case, we say that a lies to b on the sentence σ. σ is also called a lie.
By definition, a lies to b if a communicates a believed-false sentence σ to b with
the intention that σ is believed by b. (5) satisfies both the statement condition and the
addressee condition (Cabσ). (5) also satisfies the untruthfulness condition (Ba¬σ) and
the intention condition (IaBbσ).12
Mahon also argues that although the above definition seems to be suitable for most
purposes, it does have the relatively strong requirement that a speaker intends to deceive
on the direct contents of his/her statement. However, a speaker may very well have an
intention to deceive about his/her belief in the truth of the statement that he/she makes,
which we call an intention to deceive about truthfulness.13 By contrast, we also call
the condition IaBbσ of (5) an intention to deceive about truth. Borrowing an example
of [42], suppose that an FBI agent is working undercover in a criminal organization.
The crime boss notices this fact, but the FBI agent has no suspicion of this. If the crime
boss tells the FBI agent that there are no informants in his organization, then the boss
cannot intend that the FBI agent believes this statement to be true because the boss
knows that the agent is an informant. In this case, the crime boss can only intend that
the FBI agent believes that the boss believes this statement to be true. According to
the previous definition, the boss is not lying to the FBI agent. To cope with such cases,
Mahon proposes another definition as follows:
To lie (to another person) is: to make a believed-false statement (to an-
other person), either with the intention that that statement be believed to
be true (by the other person), or with the intention that it be believed (by
10“A person is to be judged as lying or not lying according to the intention of his own mind, not according
to the truth or falsity of the matter itself” [5, p.55].
11Some philosophers argue that an intention to deceive is not a necessary condition of lying, however [14].
12Note again that a speaker believes ¬σ while communicating σ to a hearer by intending the hearer’s
believing σ at the moment when the communication is taken place.
13In [43], it is called the believed truthfulness condition.
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the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person
making the statement), or with both intentions—[42, (L6*)].
Lies about truthfulness are formulated in BIC as follows.
Definition 3.2 (lie about truthfulness) Let a and b be two agents and σ ∈ Φ.
LIEBab(σ)
def
= Cabσ ∧Ba¬σ ∧ IaBbBaσ. (6)
In (6), an intention to deceive about truthfulness is represented by IaBbBaσ. In
contrast to Definition 3.2, lies in Definition 3.1 are called lies about truth. Using (6),
Mahon’s second definition (L6*) of lies is stated in BIC as follows.
LIE∗ab(σ)
def
= LIEab(σ) ∨ LIEBab(σ) . (7)
Mahon contends that these two definitions, (L6) and (L6*) of [42], are the best
definitions of lies. In what follows, LIE(B)ab (σ) means either LIEab(σ) or LIE
B
ab(σ).
As the FBI example shows, “intention to deceive about truthfulness” might be the case
without “intention to deceive about truth”. The relation between lies about truth and
lies about truthfulness is characterized using (3) as follows.
Proposition 3.1 (relation between LIE and LIEB)
 (LIEBab(σ) ∧ Com Belab(σ)) ⊃ LIEab(Baσ).
Proof: LIEBab(σ)∧Com Belab(σ) impliesCabBaσ∧Ba¬σ∧IaBbBaσ. SinceBa¬σ
implies Ba¬Baσ by (DB) and (5B), the result holds. 
Lies are not sincere communication.
Proposition 3.2 (lie is not sincere)
 (LIE(B)ab (σ) ∧ (I-)SINCab(σ)) ⊃ ⊥.
Proof: LIE(B)ab (σ) ∧ (I-)SINCab(σ) implies Ba¬σ ∧ Baσ, which implies ¬Baσ ∧
Baσ (DB). Contradiction. 
A lie on valid or contradictory sentences is meaningless.
Proposition 3.3 (lie on valid or contradictory sentences)
1.  LIE(B)ab () ⊃ ⊥ .
2.  LIE(B)ab (⊥) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: 1. Both LIEab() and LIEBab() imply Ba⊥ that contradicts (DB).
2. Both LIEab(⊥) and LIEBab(⊥) imply Cab⊥ that contradicts (DC). 
Lies on two sentences imply a lie on their conjunction.
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Proposition 3.4 (lie on combined sentences)
1.  (LIEab(λ) ∧ LIEab(σ) ) ⊃ LIEab(λ ∧ σ) .
2.  (LIEBab(λ) ∧ LIEBab(σ) ) ⊃ LIEBab(λ ∧ σ) .
Proof: 1. LIEab(λ)∧LIEab(σ) ≡ Cabλ∧Cabσ∧Ba¬λ∧Ba¬σ∧ IaBbλ∧ IaBbσ.
By (RC), (RB) and Proposition 2.1, it is equivalent to Cab(λ ∧ σ) ∧ Ba(¬λ ∧ ¬σ) ∧
IaBb(λ∧σ). Since  Ba(¬λ∧¬σ) ⊃ Ba¬(λ∧σ) by (P), (NB) and (KB), the result
holds.
2. By Proposition 2.1, BbBaλ ∧BbBaσ ≡ BbBa(λ ∧ σ). By (EI) and (RI), we have
IaBbBaλ∧ IaBbBaσ ≡ IaBbBa(λ∧σ). Hence, the result holds by the proof of 1. 
The converse implication of Proposition 3.4 does not hold in general. For instance,
if a job applicant says he/she has skill in both typing and technical writing and he/she
in fact has no skill in technical writing, he/she is lying. But this does not imply that
he/she is lying on the skill in typing.
A single lie makes the whole communication a lie.
Proposition 3.5 (combining lie and sincere communication)
 (LIEab(λ) ∧ I-SINCab(σ) ) ⊃ LIEab(λ ∧ σ) .
Proof: LIEab(λ)∧ I-SINCab(σ) implies Cabλ∧Cabσ, Ba¬λ∧Baσ, and IaBbλ∧
IaBbσ. Since  Ba¬λ∧Baσ ≡ Ba(¬λ∧σ) by (RB) and  Ba(¬λ∧σ) ⊃ Ba¬(λ∧σ)
by (P), (NB) and (KB), the result holds. 
Lies on contrary sentence are meaningless.
Proposition 3.6 (lie on contrary sentences)
1.  (LIEab(σ) ∧ LIEab(¬σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
2.  (LIEBab(σ) ∧ LIEBab(¬σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: The results hold by Proposition 3.3(2) and Proposition 3.4. 
When an agent lies about truthfulness, he/she cannot lie on Moore sentences.
Proposition 3.7 (lie on Moore sentence)
 LIEBab(σ ∧ ¬Baσ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: LIEBab(σ∧¬Baσ) implies IaBbBa(σ∧¬Baσ)which is equivalent to IaBb(Baσ∧
Ba¬Baσ) (Proposition 2.1). Since Baσ implies BaBaσ (4B) and Ba¬Baσ implies
¬BaBaσ (DB),  Baσ ∧ Ba¬Baσ ⊃ ⊥. By (NB), (KB), (NI), and (KI), 
IaBb(Baσ ∧ Ba¬Baσ) ⊃ IaBb⊥. Hence, IaBb(Baσ ∧ Ba¬Baσ) implies IaBb⊥.
On the other hand, ¬Bb⊥ (DB) thereby Ia¬Bb⊥ (NI) which implies ¬IaBb⊥ (DI).
Contradiction. 
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When an agent lies about truth, the next result holds.
Proposition 3.8 (lies on a sentence and its disbelief)
 (LIEab(σ) ∧ LIEab(¬Baσ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: LIEab(σ) impliesBa¬σ, which implies ¬Baσ (DB). ¬Baσ impliesBa¬Baσ
(5B), which implies¬BaBaσ (DB). On the other hand,LIEab(¬Baσ) impliesBaBaσ.
Contradiction. 
If an agent lies, he/she has a belief of his/her dishonest act.
Proposition 3.9 (introspection)
 LIE(B)ab (σ) ⊃ Ba LIE(B)ab (σ) .
Proof: LIEab(σ) and LIEBab(σ) respectively imply Ba LIEab(σ) and Ba LIE
B
ab(σ)
by Defs 3.1 and 3.2 and the axioms (4CB), (4B), (4IB), and (RB). 
When an agent is rationally balanced, lying to oneself leads to contradiction.14
Proposition 3.10 (lie to oneself)
1.  (LIEaa(σ) ∧RBa(¬σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
2.  (LIEBaa(σ) ∧RBa(¬Baσ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: 1. LIEaa(σ) implies Ba¬σ ∧ IaBaσ. By (DB), (NI) and (KI), it holds that
 IaBaσ ⊃ Ia¬Ba¬σ. So IaBaσ implies Ia¬Ba¬σ. On the other hand, RBa(¬σ) ∧
Ba¬σ implies ¬Ia¬Ba¬σ. Contradiction.
2. LIEBaa(σ) implies Ba¬σ ∧ IaBaBaσ, which implies Ia¬Ba¬Baσ by (DB), (NI),
(KI) and (MP). Also, Ba¬σ implies ¬Baσ (DB) that implies Ba¬Baσ (5B). By
RBa(¬Baσ), Ba¬Baσ implies ¬Ia¬Ba¬Baσ, which contradicts Ia¬Ba¬Baσ. 
By definition, lies depend only on the belief state of the speaker and his/her act
of communication. In many cases, however, one has an incentive to lie. In the next
subsection, we will consider conditions under which an agent decides to lie.
3.2 Lies with objectives
One usually has motives for lying and several reasons might be behind the act. Suppose
that an agent has a desired outcome that he/she wants to obtain, while he/she believes
that the outcome would not be achieved by telling true beliefs. On the other hand,
he/she believes that the outcome might be achieved by telling false beliefs. In this
case, the agent has an incentive to lie.
14“Self-deception exists, I will say, when a person lies to himself, that is to say, persuades himself to
believe what he knows is not so. ... Thus, self-deception involves an inner conflict, perhaps the existence of
contradiction” [25].
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We call this lies with objectives. By lies with objectives, a speaker intends to lead a
hearer to believe a particular sentence. An objective is an effect expected by a speaker
with respect to the result of reasoning by a hearer. Thus, in lies with objectives a
speaker reasons about what a hearer believes in the context of discourse. Lies with
objectives are formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.3 (lie with objective) Let a and b be two agents and σ, ϕ ∈ Φ.
O-LIEab(σ, ϕ)
def
= IaBb ϕ ∧ ¬BaBbϕ ∧BaBb(σ ⊃ ϕ) ∧Ba¬σ ∧ Cabσ . (8)
In this case, a lies to b on σ with an objective ϕ.
The intuitive meaning of (8) is as follows. An agent a lies on σ with an objective ϕ
if (i) a has an intention to make b believe a sentence ϕ (IaBb ϕ), and (ii) a disbelieves
that b believes ϕ (¬BaBbϕ), while (iii) a believes that the believed-false sentence σ
leads b to believe ϕ (BaBb(σ ⊃ ϕ)∧Ba¬σ), then (iv) a communicates σ to b (Cabσ).
Note that lies with objectives do not necessarily require a speaker a’s intention of a
hearer b’s believing σ. The speaker intends to make the hearer believe an objective
sentence ϕ, instead. For instance, when a woman gets a telephone call from a sales-
person and says that she has something on the stove which is in fact false, she does not
necessarily intend to make the salesperson believe that she is cooking but intends to
make the salesperson believe that she is not able to talk now. As the case of lies, we
can have the second definition for lies with objectives by replacing BaBb(σ ⊃ ϕ) with
BaBb(Baσ ⊃ ϕ).
Example 3.1 Suppose that a salesperson a is dealing with a customer b. The salesper-
son has the objective of the customer’s buying a product. Then a has an intention to
make b believe ϕ = buy, but disbelieves that b believes it:
IaBb buy ∧ ¬BaBb buy.
The salesperson also believes that the customer will buy the product if it has a high
quality:
BaBb(high quality ⊃ buy).
The salesperson believes that the quality of the product is not high, but communicates
the contrary to the customer:
Ba¬high quality ∧ Cab high quality.
In this case, O-LIEab(high quality, buy) holds.
A lie for the valid or contradictory objective sentence makes no sense.
Proposition 3.11 (lie with objective  or ⊥)
1.  O-LIEab(σ,) ⊃ ⊥ .
2.  O-LIEab(σ,⊥) ⊃ ⊥ .
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Proof: 1. O-LIEab(σ,) implies ¬BaBb by the second conjunct of (8), while 
BaBb by a repeated application of (NB). Contradiction.
2. O-LIEab(σ,⊥) implies IaBb⊥ by the first conjunct of (8), while from  ¬Bb⊥
(DB) it holds that  Ia¬Bb⊥ (NI) thereby  ¬IaBb⊥ (DI). Contradiction. 
As a special case, a may lie to b on the objective sentence ϕ to make b believe ϕ.
The next result follows by the definition.
Proposition 3.12 (O-lie on the objective sentence)
O-LIEab(ϕ,ϕ) ≡ ¬BaBb ϕ ∧ LIEab(ϕ) .
In O-LIEab(ϕ,ϕ), the condition ¬BaBb ϕ means that a has motives for lying
when a disbelieves that b believes the desired outcome ϕ. Thus, the definition of lies
with objectives is stronger than the definition of lies of Definition 3.1. This is due to
the fact that lies with objectives have an additional condition to have desired outcomes,
so that if a believes that b already believes ϕ, there is no reason to lie anymore.
4 Bullshit, Withholding Information and Half-Truth
In this section, we formulate three different categories of dishonesty—bullshit, with-
holding information and half-truth. We investigate their formal properties and connec-
tions to lies.
4.1 Bullshit
Frankfurt [33] studies a category of dishonesty, called bullshit, that is different from
lies. Bullshit is a statement that “is grounded neither in a belief that it is true nor,
as a lie must be, in a belief that it is not true. It is just this lack of connection to
a concern with truth—this indifference to how things really are—that I regarded as
of the essence of bullshit” (ibid., pp. 33–34).15 As an example, consider a financial
consultant paid by the hour to provide advice to his clients. The consultant gives advice
to buy stocks, for instance, but he may or may not believe that buying stocks is the best
strategy (due to the lack of expertise). Bullshit is a quite common phenomenon in daily
life. Frankfurt states a reason for its occurrence as follows: “Bullshit is unavoidable
whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking
about. Thus the production of bullshit is stimulated whenever a person’s obligations
or opportunities to speak about some topic exceed his knowledge of the facts that are
relevant to that topic” (ibid., p.63). Bullshit can formally be defined in BIC as follows.
Definition 4.1 (bullshit) Let a and b be two agents and σ ∈ Φ.
BSab(σ)
def
= Cabσ ∧ ¬Baσ ∧ ¬Ba¬σ. (9)
In this case, we say that an agent a bullshits to another agent b on the sentence σ. σ is
also called bullshit (for short, BS).
15Cohen [22] argues against this view and bullshit could be produced by a person who may concern about
the truth. In this paper, however, we follow Frankfurt’s definition.
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In lies (Defs 3.1 and 3.2), the speaker a disbelieves σ but believes ¬σ. When
bullshitting, on the other hand, a disbelieves ¬σ as well. In other words, a has no
belief with respect to the truth value of σ.16
Thus, BS satisfies the statement condition and the addressee condition of Sec-
tion 2.2, while it does not satisfy the untruthfulness condition of Section 3.1. Moreover,
BS does not satisfy the intention condition. In the example at the beginning of this sec-
tion, the financial consultant has no interest in making the client believe that buying
stocks is the best strategy or not. The only concern of the consultant is that the client
believes that the statement is based on financial expertise. Since a speaker has no be-
lief with respect to σ, there is a freedom for the speaker to communicate σ or ¬σ.
The choice whether to communicate σ or ¬σ depends on the speaker’s opinion on how
likely it will be for a hearer to believe one of them (given some additional explanation).
This is in contrast to lies where speakers have no freedom to make this choice because
one of these options (either σ or ¬σ) will have consequences they might want to en-
joy. A liar usually has an interest in creating a particular belief at a hearer. This is not
always the case for BS, however. Another difference is that while one can lie on one’s
own beliefs LIEab(Baσ), this is not the case for BS.
Proposition 4.1 (BS on one’s own belief)
1.  BSab(Baσ) ⊃ ⊥ .
2.  BSab(¬Baσ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: BothBSab(Baσ) andBSab(¬Baσ) imply¬BaBaσ∧¬Ba¬Baσ. Here¬BaBaσ
implies ¬Baσ by contraposition of (4B), which implies Ba¬Baσ (5B). This contra-
dicts ¬Ba¬Baσ. 
Proposition 4.1 implies that BS on a sentence and its disbelief is impossible.
 (BSab(σ) ∧BSab(¬Baσ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Like lies, BS is not sincere communication.
Proposition 4.2 (BS is not sincere)
 (BSab(σ) ∧ SINCab(σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: BSab(σ) ∧ SINCab(σ) implies ¬Baσ ∧Baσ. Contradiction. 
BS on valid or contradictory sentences is meaningless.
Proposition 4.3 (BS on valid or contradictory sentences)
1.  BSab() ⊃ ⊥ .
16Van Ditmarsch [76] provides a similar definition and calls it bluff . Frankfurt distinguishes them, how-
ever. Like lying, “bluffing, too, is typically devoted to conveying something false”, on the other hand,
“although it is produced without concern with the truth, it (bullshit) need not be false” [33, pp.46–47].
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2.  BSab(⊥) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: Both BSab() and BSab(⊥) imply ¬Ba, but  Ba (NB). 
BS on contrary sentences is impossible.
Proposition 4.4 (BS on contrary sentences)
 (BSab(σ) ∧BSab(¬σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: BSab(σ) ∧BSab(¬σ) implies Cabσ ∧ Cab¬σ, so that Cab(σ ∧ ¬σ) by (RC).
This contradicts (DC). 
In contrast to lies, BS on two sentences does not imply BS on their conjunction in
general. For instance, suppose that a believes ¬λ ∨ ¬σ, and bullshits to b on both λ
and σ. In this case, Ba(¬λ∨¬σ)∧BSab(λ)∧BSab(σ) is consistent, while Ba(¬λ∨
¬σ) ∧BSab(λ ∧ σ) is inconsistent.
Combining BS and sincere communication does not produce sincere communica-
tion.
Proposition 4.5 (combining BS and sincere communication)
 (BSab(λ) ∧ SINCab(σ) ) ⊃ ¬SINCab(λ ∧ σ) .
Proof: BSab(λ) ∧ SINCab(σ) implies ¬Baλ ∧Baσ, while SINCab(λ ∧ σ) implies
Ba(λ ∧ σ) ≡ Baλ ∧Baσ. Contradiction. 
BS satisfies the introspection condition.
Proposition 4.6 (introspection)
 BSab(σ) ⊃ BaBSab(σ) .
Proof: The result holds by Definition 4.1 and the axioms (4CB), (5B) and (RB). 
BSab(σ) does not contradict the belief of the speaker a. So one cannot lie and BS
on the same sentence.
Proposition 4.7 (lie and BS on the same sentence)
 (LIEab(σ) ∧BSab(σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: LIEab(σ) implies Ba¬σ, while BSab(σ) implies ¬Ba¬σ. Contradiction. 
Sometimes BS accompanies intention. For instance, suppose a salesperson who is
paid on commission basis, but does not really know the products that he is selling. The
salesperson would make the claim that a product has a high quality, without having
any knowledge on this. This is also an example of BS. However, making a client
believe that the product has a high quality is preferred to making the client believe
that the product has a low quality. The situation here differs from that of the financial
consultant mentioned at the beginning of this subsection (who is paid by the hour by
the client, and hence has no intrinsic interest to advise to buy stocks or not). Such
intentional bullshit is defined next.
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Definition 4.2 (intentional bullshit) Let a and b be two agents and σ ∈ Φ.
I-BSab(σ)
def
= BSab(σ) ∧ IaBbσ. (10)
In this case, we say that an agent a intentionally bullshits to another agent b on the
sentence σ. σ is also called intentional bullshit (for short, intentional BS).
By contrast,BSab(σ)without IaBbσ is called unintentional. In contrast to uninten-
tional BS, intentional BS satisfies the intention condition. In this paper, we will ignore
the difference between BS and I-BS in cases where it is unimportant. (I-)BSab(σ)
means either BSab(σ) or I-BSab(σ). Like lies, it is also possible to define BS with
an intention to deceive about truthfulness by replacing the condition IaBbσ of (10)
with IaBbBaσ. In contrast to lies, a rationally-balanced agent can (intentionally) BS
to oneself, that is, (I-)BSaa(σ) is consistent with both RBa(σ) and RBa(¬σ).
Intentional BS is also exclusive with intentional sincere communication, and com-
bining intentional BS and intentional sincere communication results in no sincere com-
munication. Moreover, when there is intentional communication of a sentence, sincere
communication, lies and intentional BS are exhaustive.
Proposition 4.8 (exhaustiveness)
 (Cabσ ∧ IaBbσ) ≡ I-SINCab(σ) ∨ LIEab(σ) ∨ I-BSab(σ) .
Proof: (Cabσ ∧ IaBbσ) ≡ (Cabσ ∧ IaBbσ ∧ (Baσ ∨ ¬Baσ)) ≡ I-SINCab(σ) ∨
(Cabσ ∧ IaBbσ ∧ ¬Baσ). Moreover, (Cabσ ∧ IaBbσ ∧ ¬Baσ) ≡ (Cabσ ∧ IaBbσ ∧
¬Baσ ∧ (Ba¬σ ∨ ¬Ba¬σ)) ≡ (Cabσ ∧ IaBbσ ∧ ¬Baσ ∧ Ba¬σ) ∨ I-BS(σ). By
(DB), (Cabσ ∧ IaBbσ ∧ ¬Baσ ∧ Ba¬σ) ≡ (Cabσ ∧ IaBbσ ∧ Ba¬σ) ≡ LIEab(σ).
Hence, the result holds. 
BS can accompany objectives. Then BS with objectives is defined as follows.
Definition 4.3 (BS with objective) Let a and b be two agents and σ, ϕ ∈ Φ.
O-BSab(σ, ϕ)
def
= IaBb ϕ ∧ ¬BaBbϕ ∧BaBb(σ ⊃ ϕ) ∧ (I-)BSab(σ). (11)
In this case, a (intentionally) bullshits to b on σ with an objective ϕ.
In (11), a (intentionally) bullshits on σ with an objective ϕ if (i) a has an intention
to make b believe a sentence ϕ, and (ii) a disbelieves that b believes ϕ, while (iii) a
believes that the unknown sentence σ leads b to believe ϕ, then (iv) a (intentionally)
bullshits to b on σ. As in the case of lies with objectives, the intention condition on
the sentence σ is not necessarily needed. In particular, O-BS on the objective sentence
becomes O-BSab(ϕ,ϕ) ≡ ¬BaBbϕ ∧ I-BSab(ϕ).
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4.2 Withholding information
Sometimes the act of simply remaining silent with a deceptive intention is called “lie of
omission” [42] or “withholding information” [15]. According to [15, p.56], “to with-
hold information is to fail to offer information that would help someone acquire true
beliefs and/or correct false beliefs.” For instance, a job applicant who has a criminal
record but does not inform the employer of this fact is withholding information. With-
holding information is similar but different from concealing information. “To conceal
information is to do things to hide information from someone—to prevent someone
from discovering it” (ibid., p. 56). That is, a person just does not take an action of of-
fering information in withholding information, while a person takes an action of hiding
information in concealing information. It is worth noting that withholding or conceal-
ing information is not necessarily immoral. Suppose that a robber breaks into your
home and demands to know where your valuables are. If you do not tell the location of
valuables (with an intention that the robber does not believe it), then it would not be im-
moral. Withholding information is considered immoral “if there is a clear expectation,
promise, and/or professional obligation that such information will be provided” (ibid,
p. 56). Our current logic is not expressive enough to represent expectation, promise, or
obligation. This section formulates withholding information in BIC for the purpose of
contrasting it with lies or bullshit which is considered rather immoral.
We consider that an agent awithholds information σ from bwhen amakes no com-
munication to b on a believed-true sentence σ with the intention that σ is disbelieved
by b. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 4.4 (withholding information) Let a and b be two agents and σ ∈ Φ.
WIab(σ)
def
= ¬Cabσ ∧Baσ ∧ Ia¬Bbσ. (12)
In this case, we say that an agent a withholds information (for short, WI) σ from
another agent b. σ is also called withheld information.
Unlike lies and BS, an agent makes no statement when withholding information.
So the statement condition, the addressee condition, and the truthfulness condition of
Section 2.2 are not satisfied, and the untruthfulness condition of Section 3.1 is also not
satisfied. WI is not considered sincere communication in the sense that a speaker does
not communicate a believed-true sentence.
Proposition 4.9 (WI is not sincere)
 (WIab(σ) ∧ (I-)SINCab(σ)) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof:WIab(σ) ∧ (I-)SINCab(σ) implies ¬Cabσ ∧ Cabσ. Contradiction. 
Withholding valid or contradictory sentences is meaningless.
Proposition 4.10 (WI on valid or contradictory sentences)
1.  WIab() ⊃ ⊥ .
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2.  WIab(⊥) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: 1.WIab() implies ¬Cab, however, Cab is a theorem by (NC).
2.WIab(⊥) implies Ba⊥, which contradicts (DB). 
WI on two sentences implies WI on their conjunction.
Proposition 4.11 (WI on combined sentences)
 (WIab(λ) ∧WIab(σ) ) ⊃ WIab(λ ∧ σ) .
Proof: First, WIab(λ) ∧WIab(σ) implies ¬Cabλ ∧ ¬Cabσ, which implies ¬Cabλ ∨
¬Cabσ by (P), which is in turn equivalent to ¬Cab(λ ∧ σ) by (RC). Secondly,
WIab(λ)∧WIab(σ) implies Baλ∧Baσ, which is equivalent to Ba(λ∧ σ) by (RB).
Thirdly,WIab(λ)∧WIab(σ) implies Ia¬Bbλ∧Ia¬Bbσ which is equivalent to Ia(¬Bbλ∧
¬Bbσ) by (RI), which implies Ia(¬Bbλ ∨ ¬Bbσ) which is in turn equivalent to
Ia¬Bb(λ ∧ σ) by (RB), (P) and (EI). Hence, the result holds. 
Combining WI and sincere communication does not result in sincere communica-
tion.
Proposition 4.12 (combining WI and sincere communication)
 (WIab(λ) ∧ (I-)SINCab(σ) ) ⊃ ¬ (I-)SINCab(λ ∧ σ) .
Proof: WIab(λ)∧(I-)SINCab(σ) implies ¬Cabλ∧Cabσ, while (I-)SINCab(λ∧σ)
implies Cab(λ ∧ σ) thereby Cabλ ∧ Cabσ by (RC). Contradiction. 
Proposition 4.13 (WI on contrary sentences)
 (WIab(σ) ∧WIab(¬σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof:WIab(σ) ∧WIab(¬σ) implies Baσ ∧Ba¬σ, contradiction. 
WI satisfies the introspection condition.
Proposition 4.14 (introspection)
 WIab(σ) ⊃ BaWIab(σ) .
Proof: The result holds by Definition 4.4 and the axioms (5CB), (4B), and (4IB). 
When an agent is rationally balanced, withholding information from oneself is im-
possible.
Proposition 4.15 (WI from oneself)
 (WIaa(σ) ∧RBa(σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
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Proof:WIaa(σ) implies Baσ ∧ Ia¬Baσ. By RBa(σ), Baσ implies ¬Ia¬Baσ. Con-
tradiction. 
Lying on a sentence implies WI on its negated sentence.
Proposition 4.16 (lie implies WI)
 LIEab(σ) ⊃ WIab(¬σ) .
Proof: If LIEab(σ) holds, then Cabσ ∧Ba¬σ ∧ IaBbσ. Cabσ implies ¬Cab¬σ (DC).
IaBbσ implies Ia¬Bb¬σ by (DB), (KI), and (NI). Hence, the result holds. 
It is impossible to lie (or (I-)BS) and WI on the same sentence.
Proposition 4.17 (Lie, BS and WI on the same sentence)
 ( (LIEab(σ) ∨ (I-)BSab(σ)) ∧WIab(σ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: LIEab(σ) or (I-)BSab(σ) implies Cabσ, but WIab(σ) implies ¬Cabσ. Con-
tradiction. 
It is also possible to define WI with an intention to deceive about truthfulness by
replacing Ia¬Bbσ with Ia¬BbBaσ in WIab(σ). WI with objectives is defined as
follows.
Definition 4.5 (WI with objective) Let a and b be two agents and σ, ϕ ∈ Φ.
O-WIab(σ, ϕ)
def
= IaBb ϕ ∧ ¬BaBbϕ ∧Ba(¬Bbσ ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧WIab(σ). (13)
In this case, a withholds information σ from b with an objective ϕ.
In (13), a withholds information σ from b with an objective ϕ if (i) a has an in-
tention to make b believe a sentence ϕ, and (ii) a disbelieves that b believes ϕ, while
(iii) a believes that b’s lacking information σ leads b to believe ϕ, then (iv) a with-
holds information σ from b. In particular, a can withhold ¬ϕ to make b believe ϕ:
O-WIab(¬ϕ,ϕ) ≡ IaBbϕ ∧ ¬BaBbϕ ∧ Ba(¬Bb¬ϕ ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ ¬Cab¬ϕ ∧ Ba¬ϕ.
On the other hand, O-WIab(ϕ,ϕ) implies ¬BaBbϕ ∧ Ba(¬Bbϕ ⊃ Bbϕ) which is
inconsistent.
4.3 Half-Truth
Half-truth is a partially true statement intended to deceive or mislead.17 That is, a
speaker makes a believed-true statement with the intention that a hearer misuses it to
reach a wrong conclusion. It is often understood as indirect lies or lying while saying
the truth [77]. For instance, John, who wants to marry his girlfriend Mary, tells her
that he got a permanent position at a company. Mary then considers that John has a
stable income now and would agree to marry him. The company is almost bankrupt,
17Collins English Dictionary.
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however, and John believes that he would not get a stable income. But John does not
tell Mary that his company is going bankrupt. In this speech act, John is telling the
truth, while he expects that Mary will reach a conclusion “stable income” which he
believes to be false. Thus, different from lies or BS, a speaker asserts what he/she
believes true, while, at the same time, he/she conceals something of the truth hoping
that a hearer will make an incorrect inference based on his/her belief.18 Half-truths are
formulated in BIC as follows.
Definition 4.6 (half-truth) Let a and b be two agents and δ, σ ∈ Φ.
HTab(σ, δ)
def
= I-SINCab(σ) ∧ ¬BaBbδ ∧BaBb(σ ⊃ δ)
∧Ba¬δ ∧ ¬Cab¬δ ∧ IaBbδ. (14)
In this case, we say that an agent a provides a half-truth (for short, HT) to another
agent b on the sentence σ to reach δ. σ is also called an HT.
The meaning of (14) is explained as follows. First, a communicates a believed-
true sentence σ with the intention of making b believe it (I-SINCab(σ)). Secondly,
a disbelieves that b believes δ (¬BaBbδ), while a believes that σ makes b believe δ.
(BaBb(σ ⊃ δ)). Thirdly, a believes the falsity of δ (Ba¬δ) but does not communicate
¬δ to b with the intention of making b believe δ (¬Cab¬δ ∧ IaBbδ).
Compared with definitions of lies, BS and WI, one can observe that the act of HT is
a bit complicated. In fact, “(t)he deceiver takes a more circuitous route to his success,
where lying is an easier and more certain way to mislead” [1, p.440]. A reason for the
complication is due to the fact that HT relies on the speaker’s belief about the hearer’s
inference.19 By definition, HT is an intentional sincere communication, so it satisfies
the statement condition, the addressee condition, the truthfulness condition, and the
intention condition of Section 2.2.
Example 4.1 The conversation between John and Mary in the above example is rep-
resented as follows. First, John (a) informs Mary (b) that he got a permanent position
at a company with the intention that she believes the fact:
Cab permanent ∧Ba permanent ∧ IaBb permanent.
John disbelieves that Mary believes his stable income, but he believes that the perma-
nent position makes Mary believe his stable income:
¬BaBbstable ∧BaBb(permanent ⊃ stable).
On the other hand, John believes that he will not get a stable income but does not
inform Mary of this fact with the intention that she believes his stable income:
Ba¬stable ∧ ¬Cab ¬ stable ∧ IaBb stable.
In this case, HTab(permanent, stable) holds.
18It is called deception in [1]. In this paper, however, we distinguish half-truths and deception that is
explained later.
19An experimental study in neuroscience shows that increased demands on cognitive control arise when a
person expresses the truth in an attempt to deceive another person [13].
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One cannot tell a half-truth on σ to reach σ.
Proposition 4.18 (impossible HT)
 HTab(σ, σ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: HTab(σ, σ) implies Baσ ∧Ba¬σ, contradiction. 
HT on contradictory sentences is meaningless.
Proposition 4.19 (HT on contradictory sentences)
 HTab(⊥, δ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: HTab(⊥, δ) implies Cab⊥, which contradicts (DC). 
On the other hand, HT on valid sentences is consistent. HT on two sentences
implies HT on their disjunction.
Proposition 4.20 (HT on combined sentences)
 (HTab(λ, δ) ∧HTab(σ, δ) ) ⊃ HTab(λ ∨ σ, δ) .
Proof: First, HTab(λ, δ) ∧ HTab(σ, δ) implies SINCab(λ) ∧ SINCab(σ) which is
equivalent to SINCab(λ ∧ σ) (Proposition 2.3). It implies SINCab(λ ∨ σ) by (P),
(KC), (KB), (NC), (NB), and (MP). Secondly, HTab(λ, δ) ∧ HTab(σ, δ) implies
BaBb(λ ⊃ δ) ∧BaBb(σ ⊃ δ), which implies BaBb((λ ∨ σ) ⊃ δ) by Proposition 2.1
and (EB). Hence, the result holds. 
By contrast, (HTab(λ, δ)∧HTab(σ, δ)) ⊃ HTab(λ∧σ, δ) does not hold in general.
This is because a believes that individual sentences λ or σ would lead b to believe δ,
but this does not imply that the combined sentence λ ∧ σ would also lead b to believe
δ. So (HTab(λ, δ) ∧ (I-)SINCab(σ)) ⊃ HTab(λ ∧ σ, δ) does not hold too.
The following properties hold by the definition of HT.
Proposition 4.21 (HT on contrary sentences)
 (HTab(σ, δ) ∧HTab(¬σ, δ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
Proof: HTab(σ, δ) ∧HTab(¬σ, δ) implies Cabσ ∧ Cab¬σ, contradiction. 
Proposition 4.22 (introspection)
 HTab(σ, δ) ⊃ BaHTab(σ, δ) .
Proof: The result holds by Definition 4.6 and the axioms (4B), (5B), (4CB), (5CB),
and (4IB). 
Proposition 4.23 (HT to oneself)
 (HTaa(σ, δ) ∧RBa(¬δ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
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Proof: HTaa(σ, δ)∧RBa(¬δ) implies IaBaδ∧¬Ia¬Ba¬δ. By (DB), (NI), and (KI),
 ¬Ia¬Ba¬δ ⊃ ¬IaBaδ. Hence, IaBaδ ∧ ¬Ia¬Ba¬δ implies IaBaδ ∧ ¬IaBaδ by
(MP). Contradiction. 
By contrast, HTaa(σ, δ) ∧ RBa(σ) is consistent because a performs sincere com-
munication on the sentence σ.
One cannot lie (or (I-)BS) and HT on the same sentence. On the other hand,
HTab(σ, δ) impliesWIab(¬δ).
Proposition 4.24 (relationship between lie, BS, WI and HT)
1.  (LIEab(σ) ∧HTab(σ, δ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
2.  ( (I-)BSab(σ) ∧HTab(σ, δ) ) ⊃ ⊥ .
3.  HTab(σ, δ) ⊃ WIab(¬δ) .
Proof: 1.LIEab(σ)∧HTab(σ, δ) impliesBa¬σ∧Baσ, contradiction. 2. (I-)BSab(σ)∧
HTab(σ, δ) implies ¬Baσ ∧ Baσ, contradiction. 3. HTab(σ, δ) implies Ba¬δ ∧
¬Cab¬δ ∧ IaBbδ. By IaBbδ, Ia¬Bb¬δ is proved by (DB), (NI), (KI), and (MP).
Hence, HTab(σ, δ) impliesWIab(¬δ). 
HT with objectives is defined as follows.
Definition 4.7 (HT with objective) Let a and b be two agents and δ, σ, ϕ ∈ Φ.
O-HTab(σ, δ, ϕ)
def
= IaBb ϕ ∧ ¬BaBbϕ ∧BaBb(δ ⊃ ϕ) ∧HTab(σ, δ). (15)
In this case, a provides a half-truth to b on σ to reach δ with an objective ϕ.
In (15), a provides a half-truth sentence σ to b with an objective ϕ if (i) a has an
intention to make b believe ϕ, and (ii) a disbelieves that b believes ϕ, while (iii) a
believes that the believed-false sentence δ leads b to believe ϕ, then (iv) a provides a
half-truth sentence σ to b to make b believe δ. In particular, when δ ≡ ϕ, it holds that
O-HTab(σ, ϕ, ϕ) ≡ HTab(σ, ϕ).
Note that HT already has an objective by itself. A speaker provides a believed-true
sentence σ with the intention that a hearer believes a believed-false sentence δ. On the
other hand, the sentence ϕ in Definition 4.7 is not necessarily a believed-false sentence
by the speaker. Let us illustrate this by Example 4.1: John informs Mary that he gets a
permanent position at a company. John intends Mary to believe that he will get a stable
income, which he believes false. John expects that Mary will decide to marry him by
this fact. In this case, O-HTab(permanent, stable, marry) holds.
5 Maxims for Dishonest Agents
The philosopher Paul Grice introduces the following maxims for conversation [35]:
1. (The maxim of quality)
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• Do not say what you believe to be false.
• Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
2. (The maxim of quantity)
• Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current pur-
poses of the exchange).
• Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
3. (The maxim of relation) Be relevant.
4. (The maxim of manner) Avoid obscurity of expression; Avoid ambiguity; Be
brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity); and Be orderly.
Lies violate the first item of the maxim of quality, and BS violates the second item
of it. WI and HT violate the first item of the maxim of quantity. Thus, Grice’s maxims
of quality/quantity are violated by dishonest agents.20 In fact, Grice introduces those
maxims in his cooperative principle, while dishonest speech acts are non-cooperative
communication in general. Then our question is whether Grice’s maxims can give
us any guideline for dishonest agents in their communication. This section provides
quantitative and qualitative guidelines for dishonest communication that should ideally
be followed by the agents.
5.1 Quantitative maxims
We first consider quantitative guidelines for dishonest communication. Normally one
wants to keep his/her dishonesties as small as possible. In lying, for instance, a smaller
lie would be considered less sinful than a bigger one from the moral viewpoint. More-
over, from self-interested reasons, a smaller lie would cause less personal discomfort
and result in lower criticism or punishment if detected. Kupfer says, “The lie, to his
immediate advantage, often results in an overall net loss of freedom in what he can do
or say. [. . . ] The liar must be circumspect in his speech and action, guarding against
the emergence of his real beliefs. The need to maintain the deception binds him” [38,
p.119]. A bigger lie makes the liar less free, which he wants to avoid. From the prac-
tical viewpoint, lies make the belief state of a hearer deviate from the objective reality
(or, at least from the reality as believed by a speaker) and a bigger lie would increase
such deviation. This is undesirable for a speaker because it increases the chance of the
lie being detected. Thus, an effective lie is a lie that does not have too much “collateral
damage” on a hearer. This intuition is formulated by the following postulate which is
meant to have a normative value. Let λ, σ, ϕ ∈ Φ such that  λ ⊃ σ. Then
(PL) Ba(O-LIEab(λ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ Ba(O-LIEab(λ ∧ σ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ)
⊃ ¬O-LIEab(λ ∧ σ, ϕ).
(PL) says that if a believes that two lies λ and λ ∧ σ are usable for achieving an
objective ϕ, then a does not lie on the bigger one λ ∧ σ. Every (natural or artificial)
20Fallis [30] argues that stating a believed-false sentence is considered a lie only if Grice’s first maxim of
quality is in effect as a norm of conversation.
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agent should try to satisfy the postulate (PL) as well as those discussed further on
in this section when communicating with another agent. (PL) can be satisfied by
the agent abstaining from communicating the lie λ ∧ σ in case he/she believes that
a simpler lie λ succeeds in persuading the hearer of believing ϕ. More specifically,
in Example 3.1, if a salesperson a believes that O-LIEab(high quality, buy) and
O-LIEab(high quality∧valuable, buy) are both effective to persuade a customer
to buy a product, then a can satisfy the postulate (PL) by not lying on the sentence
high quality ∧ valuable.
Similar postulates are considered for BS and WI. Let λ, σ, ϕ ∈ Φ such that 
λ ⊃ σ. Then
(PBS) Ba(O-BSab(λ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ Ba(O-BSab(λ ∧ σ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ)
⊃ ¬O-BSab(λ ∧ σ, ϕ).
(PWI) Ba(O-WIab(λ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ Ba(O-WIab(λ ∧ σ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ)
⊃ ¬O-WIab(λ ∧ σ, ϕ).
The postulates (PL), (PBS) and (PWI) are summarized as the next maxims.
[Quantitative Maxims for Dishonesty]
Maxim I: Lie as little as possible to achieve your objective.
Maxim II: BS as little as possible to achieve your objective.
Maxim III: WI as little as possible to achieve your objective.
These maxims say that it is reasonable (and courteous to a hearer) not to lie, BS,
and WI more than absolutely necessary.21 In HT, on the other hand, this is not nec-
essarily the case. The reason is that providing more information in HT increases the
knowledge of a hearer. For a speaker, providing more information implies concealing
less information, which alleviates immoral feeling of the speaker. Thus, there seems
no reason to prefer a smaller HT that provides less information, so we do not have a
maxim mandating it.
5.2 Qualitative maxims
Next we consider qualitative guidelines for dishonest communication. Comparing lies
and BS, lies are considered more sinful than BS. This is because a liar intentionally
implants wrong beliefs at the hearer, while a bullshitter spits out statements without
knowing if they are true. As a result, “people do tend to be more tolerant of bullshit
than of lies, perhaps because we are less inclined to take the former as a personal
affront” [33, p.50]. This intuition is formulated as follows. Let λ, σ, ϕ ∈ Φ such that
λ ≡ σ. Then
(PLB) Ba(O-LIEab(λ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ Ba(O-BSab(σ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ)
⊃ ¬O-LIEab(λ, ϕ).
21The maxims I and II are actually in line with the Grice’s second quantity maxim “Do not make your
contribution more informative than is required”.
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(PLB) says that if a believes that a lie σ and BS λ are both usable for achieving an
objective ϕ, then a does not choose lying on σ.
Next, suppose that an agent believes that both a lie and WI (or both BS and WI)
are effective to achieve a goal. In this case, our intuition says that WI is preferable to a
lie or BS because WI does not introduce any sentence that is disbelieved by a speaker.
The intuition is formulated as follows. Let λ, σ, ϕ ∈ Φ such that λ ≡ σ. Then
(PLW) Ba(O-LIEab(λ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ Ba(O-WIab(σ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ)
⊃ ¬O-LIEab(λ, ϕ).
(PBW) Ba(O-BSab(λ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ Ba(O-WIab(σ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ)
⊃ ¬O-BSab(λ, ϕ).
Finally, HT is considered preferable to lies, BS and WI as an agent communicates
a believed-true sentence. Let δ, λ, σ, ϕ ∈ Φ such that λ ≡ σ. Then we have the
following postulates.
(PLHT) Ba(O-LIEab(λ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ Ba(O-HTab(σ, δ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ)
⊃ ¬O-LIEab(λ, ϕ).
(PBHT) Ba(O-BSab(λ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ Ba(O-HTab(σ, δ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ)
⊃ ¬O-BSab(λ, ϕ).
(PWHT) Ba(O-WIab(λ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ) ∧ Ba(O-HTab(σ, δ, ϕ) ⊃ Bbϕ)
⊃ ¬O-WIab(λ, ϕ).
These postulates (PLB), (PLW), (PBW), (PLHT), (PBHT) and (PWHT) are
put together as the next maxims.
[Qualitative Maxims for Dishonesty]
Maxim IV: Never lie if you can achieve your objective by BS.22
Maxim V: Never lie nor BS if you can achieve your objective by WI.
Maxim VI: Never lie, BS, nor WI if you can achieve your objective by HT.
The qualitative and quantitative maxims provide guidelines that agents should try
to satisfy for both moral and self-interested reasons (lower punishments if caught). If
we assume that agents try to satisfy the dishonesty maxims, then one can characterize
an agent’s morality by the worst level of dishonesty he/she is willing to commit in order
to achieve a goal. For instance, a lawyer agent might be willing to act on HT (providing
only information favorable to his client) or WI (no lawyer would voluntarily provide
information against the desirable outcome of his case), but not to BS nor to lie. So if
one detects that an agent is performing HT, then one cannot infer that he/she is also
willing to WI, BS or lie. However, the other way round, if an agent is willing to lie,
then he/she can also be assumed to be willing to BS, WI or to HT. So an agent that
is caught on HT (or WI or BS) can perhaps still be trusted not to lie (if trust is the
22A similar imperative is mentioned in [33].
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Figure 1: Degree of trust
default attitude), but an agent that is caught on lying cannot be trusted at all anymore
(Figure 1). In multiagent systems, if agents have implemented the dishonesty maxims,
then this can be helpful for reasoning about the possible dishonesty of other agents,
and about the extent to which they can still be trusted.
In moral philosophy, dishonest behaviors are often considered morally right when
(and only when) they have better consequences than behaving honestly [15].23 In this
sense, “dishonesty” does not necessarily connote “wrongness”. The maxims provided
in this section just compare dishonest behaviors from communication viewpoints, and
do not consider contexts where dishonest behaviors have taken place. For purposes
of moral reasoning, this paper mainly focuses on fact finding: has dishonesty taken
place? It does not, however, aim to infer whether or not dishonesty may still be morally
justifiable, which would be a separate research topic. However, any reasoning about
the morality of dishonesty presupposes a theory on what dishonesty is, and what its
properties are. It is this theory that we aim to supply in this paper.
6 Discussion
In this section, we first compare different categories of dishonesty formulated so far,
and examine their connection to another category of dishonesty, deception. We then
overview related studies on dishonesty.
6.1 Comparison of different categories of dishonesty
In the previous sections, we have formulated lies, (intentional) BS, withholding in-
formation and half-truths, and examined their logical properties. Table 1 compares
different categories of dishonesties from the perspective of satisfaction of various con-
ditions discussed so far, and contrasts them with sincere communication. In the table,
the properties of statement, addressee, truthful and intention stand for the corre-
sponding conditions provided in Section 2.2. The property of untruthful stands for
the untruthfulness condition provided in Section 3.1. The property of sincere means
the condition of sincere communication (Definition 2.1). The property of inability-
(resp. inability-⊥) means the inability to apply valid (resp. contradictory) sentences.
The property of inability-¬ means the inability on contrary sentences. The property
of inability-B means the inability on one’s own belief. The property of combination
means that speech acts on individual sentences imply speech on the conjunction of
23A famous example of this is “the murderer at the door”—lying to the murderer who asks where his
victim has gone [7, 39].
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Table 1: Comparison of different categories of dishonesties
(I-)SINC LIE(B) (I-)BS WI HT
statement
√ √ √ √
addressee
√ √ √ √
truthful
√ √
untruthful
√
intention (
√
)∗
√ † (√)‡ √ √
sincere
√ √
inability- √ (3.3) √ (4.3) √ (4.10)
inability-⊥ √ (2.2) √ (3.3) √ (4.3) √ (4.10) √ (4.19)
inability-¬ √ (2.4) √ (3.6) √ (4.4) √ (4.13) √ (4.21)
inability-B
√
(4.1)
combination
√
(2.3)
√
(3.4)
√
(4.11)
introspection
√
(2.7)
√
(3.9)
√
(4.6)
√
(4.14)
√
(4.22)
self-contradiction
√
(3.10)
√
(4.15)
√
(4.23)
∗: The result holds for I-SINC. †: The result holds for LIE. ‡: The result holds for I-BS.
those sentences. The property of introspection means that one has a belief of his/her
act. The property of self-contradiction means that a speech act to oneself leads to
contradiction in the presence of the rationally-balanced condition (Definition 2.3). The
mark
√
means satisfaction of each condition, and the attached number indicates the
corresponding proposition. From the table, we can observe the following facts on
different categories of dishonesty. (i) The four dishonesties share the properties of
inability-⊥, inability-¬, and introspection. (ii) Lies are untruthful, while others are
not. (iii) Lies and WI satisfy the combination property, while others do not.24 (iv) BS
is the only category that has both intentional and unintentional cases, and is also the
only category that does not satisfy self-contradiction. Moreover, BS is the only case
that cannot act on one’s belief. (v) WI is the only category that requires neither state-
ment nor addressee. (vi)HT is the only category that does not satisfy inability-, and is
also the only case that is truthful and sincere. So each category can be distinguished by
the above properties from other categories. The comparison also explains the intuition
behind the qualitative maxims in Section 5.2. From the viewpoint of untruthfulness,
LIE(B) is worse than all other dishonesties. From the viewpoint of statement, LIE(B)
and (I-)BS are worse than WI and HT because LIE(B) and (I-)BS make statements that
is not truthful. From the viewpoint of sincerity, LIE(B), (I-)BS, and WI are worse than
HT.
6.2 Deception
Deception is an act whereby one person causes another person to have a false belief. In
[41], Mahon says that “Philosophers agree that ‘deceive’ is a success or an achievement
24Although HT cannot be combined on conjunction, it can be combined on disjunction (Proposition 4.20).
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verb, and that an act of deceiving is a perlocutionary act. Whether or not an act of
deceiving has occurred depends on whether or not a particular effect—normally, the
having of a false belief—has been produced in another; if no such effect has been
produced in another, then no deceiving has occurred.” In this respect, deception is
different from any category of dishonesties studied in this paper. According to their
definitions, whether or not a speaker lies (BS, WI, or HT) depends only on the belief
and intention of a speaker, and is independent of the effect of the action.
Since deception involves a success or an achievement of the act, its formulation
requires a logic that can express causation and effects as well as belief and intention.
Sakama and Caminada [56] formalize different forms of deception using a modal logic
of action and belief developed by Po¨rn [52]. They provide logical formulation of de-
ception by commission and deception by omission, that were originally described by
Chisholm and Feehan [19]. They investigate formal properties of eight different cat-
egories of deception and discuss their relationship to lying. Here we informally char-
acterize deception based on dishonesty studied in this paper by introducing a causal
relation to the logic. A sentence “p ⇒ q” is read as “q is a consequence of p”. It satis-
fies the axiom (p ⇒ q) ⊃ (p ∧ q) [61]. Semantically, p ⇒ q is true at a possible world
if and only if q is true in every world selected in terms of the given world in which p is
true.25 With this extension, we could define different types of deception based on lies,
I-BS, WI and HT as follows.
DecLieab(σ)
def
= LIEab(σ) ⇒ Bbσ .
DecBSab(σ)
def
= I-BSab(σ) ⇒ Bbσ .
DecWIab(σ)
def
= WIab(σ) ⇒ Bb¬σ .
DecHTab(σ, δ)
def
= HTab(σ, δ) ⇒ Bbδ .
DecLie is deception by lying, DecBS is deception by bullshitting, DecWI is decep-
tion by withholding information, andDecHT is deception by half-truths. The intuitive
reading of DecLie is that an agent a deceives another agent b on a sentence σ if a lies
to b on σ which brings about b’s believing σ. DecBS, DecWI , and DecHT have
similar meanings. Note that the definitions do not describe the belief state of a hearer b
before deceptive actions have taken place. If b originally disbelieves σ, then LIEab(σ)
contributes causally to b’s acquiring the belief in σ. Else if b originally believes σ, then
LIEab(σ) contributes causally to b’s continuing in the belief in σ. Although we do
not pursue the details of the logic and formal properties of deception in this paper, we
would still like to emphasize the difference between deception and the other categories
of dishonesty. By definition, deception succeeds if a dishonest act of an agent makes
the belief state of a hearer conform with the intention of a speaker. On the other hand,
attempted deception does not always succeed. For instance, attempted deception by ly-
ing fails if LIEab(σ) ⇒ Bbσ holds (i.e., a lies to b on σ while it does not bring about
b’s believing σ). As such, there are two cases of lying: the one is lying that attempts
but fails to deceive, and the other is lying that deceives.26 Similar distinctions are made
25We refer to [56, 61] for the formal properties of the causality operator⇒.
26Carson [15] also considers the third case: lying without attempted deception. This is because he does
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Deception

Attempted Deception

Lies that fail to deceive

DecLie 
WI that fails to deceive

DecWIﬀ
HT that fails to deceive

DecHTﬀ
I-BS that fails to deceive 
DecBS 
WI
Lie
I-BS
HT
Figure 2: Lie, I-BS, WI, HT, deception and attempted deception
for I-BS, WI, and HT. Thus, deception is the successful case of attempted deception
[15]. The relationship between lies, I-BS, WI, HT, deception and attempted deception
is illustrated in Figure 2. Note that lies imply WI (Proposition 4.16) and HT implies
WI (Proposition 4.24). On the other hand, lies and (I-)BS, lies and HT, (I-)BS and WI,
or (I-)BS and HT, are all mutually exclusive (Propositions 4.7, 4.17 and 4.24).
6.3 Related work
Some attempts have been made to formulate dishonesty using modal logic.
O’Neill [48] provides logical definitions of lies and deception based on the logic of
intentional communication [23]. He uses four different modalities of belief, intention,
common belief, and communication. A lie is defined as Lieab σ = Cab σ ∧ Ba¬σ
where Cab means that “a person a communicates a proposition σ to a person b”. Here
Cab is called assertive communication satisfying the relation Cab σ ≡ B∗ Ia (Cab σ ∧
BbBa σ)whereB∗ϕmeans that ϕ is a common belief between a and b. He also defines
the so-called “talking through your hat” as Hatab σ = Cab σ ∧ ¬Baσ and deception
as Decab σ = IaBbσ ∧ Ba¬σ ∧ Bbσ. Lieab σ represents that a speaker a intends to
get a hearer b to believe not necessarily σ but only that a believes σ. This corresponds
to the intention to deceive about truthfulness of LIEBab(σ), and is different from the
intention to deceive about truth of LIEab(σ). Hatab σ is close to BSab(σ) but has the
same intentional nature as Lieab σ. Decab σ represents that deception happens when
a intends to make b believe a believed-false sentence σ and b believes it. However,
the definition does not represent that b comes to have a false belief σ as a result of
some action of a. According to Decab σ, a deceives b when b believes σ regardless
of any action of a, which is rather odd. The primary interest of [48] is to formulate
various types of speech acts in an epistemic logic, and he does not provide comparative
analyses of different categories of dishonesties.
not consider that intention to deceive is necessary for lying. In our definition of lying, however, a speaker
intends to deceive a hearer, so we do not consider the third case here.
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Firozabadi et al. [31] formulate fraud using modal operators for obligation, action
and belief. According to their definition, fraud is a situation where an agent violates
one of its obligations and also deceives another agent that the obligation is fulfilled. An
action of an agent is considered deceptive if he/she either does not have a belief about
the truth value of some proposition but makes another agent believe that the proposition
is true or false, or he/she believes that the proposition is true/false but makes another
agent believe the opposite. These two cases are formally defined in [31] as: ¬Baϕ ∧
EaBbϕ and Ba¬ϕ ∧ EaBbϕ where Eaψ means “a brings it about that ψ”. These
definitions do not mention any means that an agent uses to bring about a result. The
authors also consider that an agent who does not succeed in his/her attempt to deceive
another agent is still a deceptive agent. Such cases, which we call attempted deception
and distinguish them from deception, are formally represented by ¬Baϕ∧HaBbϕ and
Ba¬ϕ ∧ HaBbϕ, where Haψ means that “an agent a attempts to bring about ψ, not
necessarily successful”. Their goal is to characterize specific types of fraud situations
that may occur in organized interactions like trade procedures. Firozabadi and Jones
[32] define lying in terms of basically the same action logic as [31] and formulate trust
of an agent. Suppose that an agent a, by saying something or by sending a particular
document, gets another agent b to believe that σ. Let Δ denote “the document or
information is delivered to an agent b”. Then they define lying as ¬Ba σ∧Ea(Δ, Bbσ)
which represents that a disbelieves σ, and that a makes b believe that σ by bringing it
about that Δ. The definition satisfies none of the four necessary conditions of lying in
Section 3.1, while it requires the success of lying. As a result, it is not considered as
the standard definition of lying.
Pan et al. [49] provide an axiomatic system for lies using a multi-modal logic.
According to their definition, a speech act x is a lie if a speaker intends a hearer by
performing x to form some beliefs that the speaker regards as false. Then they consider
two different types of lies based on whether or not a speech act x satisfies the sincerity
principle. Let S(x) stand for “utterance x is sincere”. A speech act x is a direct lie if
a speaker does not believe S(x) and intends a hearer by performing x to believe S(x).
A speech act x is an indirect lie if a speaker does believe S(x) but does not believe
some proposition ϕ and intends the hearer to believe ϕ by performing x. In direct lies,
a speaker does not intend to make a hearer believe a particular sentence, but intends to
make a hearer believe that the speaker is sincere. On the other hand, in indirect lies,
a speaker intends to make a hearer believe a particular sentence under the assumption
that the speaker believes that he/she conforms to the rules of sincerity principle. They
formulate these two types of lying using their logic, but they just provide definitions
and do not investigate formal properties.
Baltag and Smets [6] introduce a logic of conditional doxastic actions. According
to their formulation, the action of public successful lying is characterized by an action
plausibility model involving two actions Liea(σ) and Truea(σ). The former repre-
sents an action in which an agent a publicly lies that she knows σ while in fact she
does not know it. The latter represents an action in which a makes a public truthful an-
nouncement that she knows σ. They have preconditions ¬Kaσ andKaσ, respectively.
If a hearer b trusts the agent a and he is inclined to believe the lie, then the situation is
represented by the pre-order Truea(σ) <b Liea(σ) which means that it is more plau-
sible to b that a is telling the truth rather than lying. If a hearer already knows that σ is
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false, however, the action Liea(σ) does not succeed. Such a condition is formulated as
an action’s contextual appearance. Note that the precondition ¬Kaσ of Liea(σ) rep-
resents the ignorance of σ and is different from the untruthfulness condition. In their
formulation, lying is given as a basic epistemic action in an action plausibility model,
so it has no logical definition. Their goal is formulating multiagent belief updates with
actions by combining belief revision and dynamic epistemic logic.
Tzouvaras [73] formulates different types of lies and studies the problem of the
“Liar Paradox”. He introduces a propositional multi-modal logic KU having two
modalities: Kϕ (“ϕ is known”) and Uϕ (“ϕ is uttered”), while it has no modality
representing intention. The axiomatic system for K is S5 and the one for U is KD45.
He then introduces three definitions of lying:
L1ψ := (¬Kψ ∧ Uψ) ∨ (¬K¬ψ ∧ U¬ψ)
L2ψ := (Kψ ∧ U¬ψ) ∨ (K¬ψ ∧ Uψ)
L3ψ := (Uψ ∨ U¬ψ) ∧ (¬Kψ ∧ ¬K¬ψ).
In L1, a speaker utters a fact that is not known to be true. In L2, a speaker utters a
false fact. In L3, a speaker utters a fact that is known to be neither true nor false. By
definition, L3 implies L1. L1 and L3 do not satisfy the untruthfulness condition. On
the other hand, L2 requires the statement to be false because Kψ implies the truth
of ψ and K¬ψ implies the falsity of ψ. As argued in Section 3.1, however, this is
considered too strong, since the actual falsity of a sentence is not necessarily required
in lying. Moreover, none of them satisfies the intention condition. Using the relation
Kaψ ⊃ Baψ between knowledge and belief [37], our definition of bullshit implies L3.
Tzouvaras analyzes the Liar Paradox using these definitions. Let σ be the sentence that
“I am lying”. Then the sentence Lσ is called intentional lying where L is one of L1, L2
or L3. In this case, the liar is in intentional mode iff σ ≡ Lσ in that particular situation.
Tzouvaras shows that the paradox is resolved when a speaker is in intentional mode,
for instance, σ ≡ L1σ and Uσ just imply σ ∧ ¬Kσ.
In his formulation of trustful agents, Liau [40] defines that an agent i is an inten-
tional liar if Uiψ ∧ Bi¬ψ, while i is an irresponsible liar if Uiψ ∧ ¬Biψ. Here, Uiψ
means that an agent i utters ψ. Then an agent i is honest if he/she is not an irresponsi-
ble liar (i.e., Uiψ ⊃ Biψ for all ψ). Note that if an agent i is honest, he/she is not an
intentional liar (i.e., (Uiψ ⊃ Biψ) ⊃ (Uiψ ⊃ ¬Bi¬ψ)). He argues that an ideal form
of trust, which he calls cautious trust, should satisfy two conditions: first, an agent i
believes that if another agent j tells him ψ then j himself believes ψ (honesty); and
second, i believes that if j believes ψ then ψ in fact holds (capability). Such cautious
trust is formally defined as T cijψ
def
= Bi((Ujψ ⊃ Bjψ) ∧ (Bjψ ⊃ ψ)). He addresses
that this is a very strict requirement for i to trust j on ψ, then he uses a weaker notion
of trust Tij as a primitive operator in his logic.
Van Ditmarsch et al. [75] formulate a logic of lying in public discourse. They use
a propositional dynamic logic extended with manipulative updates, lies and announce-
ments. Different from ours, the act of lying is provided as a modality in their logic.
In notation, [¡ϕ]σ means that a formula σ is true after lying public announcement of
ϕ, which is contrasted with [!ϕ]σ representing a truthful public announcement. Van
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Ditmarsch [76] also studies dynamic aspects of lying and bluffing using dynamic epis-
temic logic. The primary interest of [75, 76] is not in precisely formulating what is
lying, but in modelling how the belief of an agent is changed by (un)truthful announce-
ments. The study [75] also provides a game-theoretical analysis of lying as an optimal
strategy in a two-person game. There have been game theoretic approaches to capture
the phenomenon of lying and deception (e.g. [24, 28]). The goal of these studies is an-
alyzing the effect of lying and deception in strategic games, rather than understanding
what is lying and deception. Sakama et al. [55] provide logical formulation of lies, BS
and deception. They introduce different types of lies, called deductive lies and abduc-
tive lies, and investigate formal properties. Deception in [55] is similar to half-truth
of this paper, while these two notions are distinguished in this paper. In this paper we
consider two definitions of lies that are considered to be the best ones by [42], while
there is a number of different definitions of lies in the literature of philosophy. Sakama
[57] provides a formal analysis of twelve definitions of lies that have been proposed
in the philosophical literature and were analyzed in an informal way by Mahon [42].
Isaac and Bridewell [36] consider a situation that a hearer believes a proposition p and
a speaker utters the negation of p. In this case, the hearer infers the speaker’s ulterior
motive behind the utterance for deciding further actions to take. They consider four
different categories of dishonesty: lying, bullshit, paltering and pandering. Paltering
involves speaking truthfully with the intent to deceive, which is similar to HT in this pa-
per. Pandering resembles bullshit and the speaker does not care about the truth value of
his utterance (although he may possibly know it). In their approach, the hearer reads the
speaker’s mind from a dialogue content and classifies possible states of dishonest acts
by the speaker. We do not study ulterior motives behind dishonesty and mindreading
from the hearer’s viewpoint in this paper. They introduce a framework for identifying
deceptive entities (FIDE) for a mindreading system to detect deception, which is not
based on a formal logic, however. Clark [20] develops a lying machine which uses
mental models theory to exploit cognitive illusions, highly fallible heuristics and biases
in human reasoning. The machine incorporates those illusions into its arguments, and
articulates the illusory arguments with the intent to deceive its audience. The study
provides empirical evidence that the machine reliably deceives ordinary humans.
Some studies show potential utility of dishonest reasoning in applications. Bonatti
et al. [8] study databases that may provide users with incorrect answers to preserve
security in a multi-user environment. They introduce a propositional modal logic to
reason about databases, secrets, and users’ beliefs. Sklar et al. [66] formulate lying in
an argument-based dialogue game. They describe an education system that presents
students with a problem and a false solution, and when they object to the solution,
asking them to justify their reaction. De Rosis et al. [27] study how agents can de-
ceive within a probabilistic framework for representing mental states. Their theory is
applied to a simplified version of Turing’s imitation game and different types of decep-
tive strategies are implemented. Zlotkin et al. [81] study negotiation in which agents
may lie. The study shows how an agent can benefit himself/herself by effectively lying
in a deal of cooperative planning. Castelfranchi et al. [17] present the utility of lies and
deception in order to obtain help or delegate tasks in cooperative activities. Wagner
and Arkin [78] develop a robot that uses a deceptive communication to escape from an
enemy robot. A robot determines whether or not a situation warrants deception based
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on an expected outcome in a game theory. Son et al. [69] provide a logical framework
for negotiation among dishonest agents. They show how intentionally false or inaccu-
rate information can be effectively used in the process of negotiation to have desired
outcomes by agents. Caminada [11] provides a comparative study between lies, bull-
shit and deception, and discusses how an intelligent agent could behave dishonestly
to win a debate in formal argumentation systems. Rahwan et al. [53] characterize the
strategy-proofness (i.e., truth-telling being a dominant strategy equilibrium) in formal
argumentation systems when agents may hide and/or lie about arguments. Sakama
[59] provides a formal model of debate games in which a player may provide false
or incorrect arguments as a tactic to win the game. Staab and Caminada [70] design
and implement an MAS-based software simulator and observe how the incentives for
dishonesty emerge in self-interested agents aiming to optimize their economic perfor-
mance. Caminada et al. [12] show that lying can promote the social welfare as well as
increase personal utilities of an agent in situations of argumentation-based judgment
aggregation.
7 Conclusion
Lying and other categories of dishonesty have been studied in philosophy and else-
where, while a logical foundation of dishonesty is a topic that has received relatively
little attention. We provided logical accounts of various categories of dishonesty and
analyzed their formal properties. The abstract framework proposed here will need to
be extended in subsequent work, but is as it stands capable of capturing the declarative
kernels of many forms of human dishonesty. Our research does not aim to provide
new philosophical insights on dishonesty, but to turn conceptually defined notions in
philosophy into a framework based on formal logic. Although some formal properties
were provided, the strength of the current paper is aimed to be conceptual rather than
purely technical. The maxims for dishonest agents can be seen as having a normative
value, and should ideally be implemented for individual agents in multiagent systems.
Dishonest behavior involves complex reasoning about a relationship between a speaker
and a hearer, their belief states, and context in which a speech act is performed. The
current study serves as a kind of base-level and would contribute to opening the topic.
An important limitation of the current work is that it is built on top of the Kripke-
style possible-world semantics, and therefore inherits some properties that are not very
realistic (for instance, logical omniscience) when providing a formal semantics for con-
cepts like beliefs, intentions and communication.27 Formalizing dishonesty in a more
expressive logic than we have currently implemented is a research challenge for the
future. We focus on declarative aspects of dishonest reasoning in this paper, while
its computational aspects are considered in [58] that introduces logic programs with
disinformation to represent and reason with dishonesty.
Understanding when an agent behaves dishonestly and how dishonest reasoning
is performed by agents is useful in identifying systems that mislead users, and pro-
viding ways to protect users from being deceived. A well-designed protocol that can
27“Indeed, knowledge, belief, desire, intention, provability, etc., all receive the exact same formal analysis
in possible-world semantics” [4].
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detect deceptive agents and distinguish disinformation is needed in an open distributed
environment like the Internet where a lot of intentionally wrong and misleading infor-
mation exists [44]. The issue of detecting dishonest agents and preventing a success of
deception is not handled in this paper but is an important research issue. Another topic
of interest is modelling the emergence of dishonesty in social environments. Some
studies show that dishonesty and credulity are behaviors that evolved by natural se-
lection [54, 68]. A recent study shows that artificial robots which compete for food
learn to conceal food information [46]. The study [60] models children’s acquisition
of dishonesty using machine learning techniques, while there is still much to be done.
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